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Giving in Unilaterally Risky Dictator Games: A Model of Allocation Decisions Under
Existential Threat
Sarah Franziska Kovatsch
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management
Abstract
This study reports experimental results from variations of the standard dictator game that capture different variants of unilat-
erally risky allocation decisions where only the dictator’s payoff is subject to risk. Thereby, it addresses the question of whether
decisions under existential threat, modeled as a risk to the dictator’s payoff, encourage or discourage generosity in individual
decision making. It aims at bridging the gap between experimental economics and psychological research on the behavioral
impact of mortality salience. Results show that giving in unilterally risky dictator games increases with the risk imposed on
the dictator’s payoff. Risk aversion falls short of explaining the increase in generosity. Instead, the observed behavior is most
likely motivated by a preference for efficient capital employment. Moreover, dictator games prove to be an apt model for
decisions under existential threat.
Keywords: dictator games; risky decisions; mortality salience; generosity; existential threat.
1. Introduction
How do we decide when death is looming?
Whenever we talk about scarcity, we also talk about value.
Scarcity does not only cause the fundamental economic re-
source allocation problem but typically also raises the value
of goods. Recently, the infamous street artist Banksy hit the
news because he equipped one of his paintings with a self-
destructive mechanism which was triggered after the paint-
ing was sold during a Sotheby’s auction. Although the paint-
ing was cut to pieces, its market value increased within hours
after the auction. Scarcity spurs value.
This principle also extends to immaterial goods. When we
are busy, hence time-constrained, we value our time higher.
In fact, the association between scarcity and value is so over-
learned that some researchers argue that its converse also
holds: highly valued goods are often perceived as rare, re-
ferred to as the scarcity heuristic. Extending this heuristic,
King et al. (2009) examine the bidirectional link between
scarcity and value applied to the meaning of death. For that
purpose, they define death as the scarcity of life.
But what happens to our allocation decisions when not
money, but lifetime is the limited variable? Does the endow-
ment effect increase and drive a valuation gap between our
own utility expectations from a set amount of money and the
expected value after discounting for a limited time horizon
(or: limited usability)? Eventually, do we become more self-
ish or more generous when facing death? These questions
shall guide the scientific endeavor behind this experimental
study. At the intersection between economics and psychol-
ogy, it will investigate allocation decisions under existential
threat, with special focus on generosity.
One of the most popular publications addressing the be-
havioral consequences of a doomsday scenario is Death and
the Afterlife (Scheffler and Kolodny, 2013) in which the au-
thors discuss a scenario where the inevitable demise of the
earth is known to occur in 30 days and leads to a grave ero-
sion of human values. Substantiating evidence for a higher
tendency towards anti-social behavior close to doomsday can
be found in a gaming study analyzing the data of more than
80.000 subjects playing a virtual apocalypse scenario (Kang
et al., 2017). Results indicate that the homicide rate in-
creases close to the end.
The present study will neither follow Scheffler and
Kolodny, 2013 path of philosophical inquiry, nor study behav-
ior in computer simulations, but instead, take an approach
based on an economic game. More importantly, it will not
focus on doomsday scenarios where all life on earth comes
to an end, but rather consider a scenario where only one in-
dividual, the decision-maker, faces an elevated risk of dying
in the close future. The experiment conducted as part of this
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5282/jums/v5i1pp35-49
S. F. Kovatsch / Junior Management Science 5(1) (2020) 35-4936
study is based on a dictator game modified to the effect that
the dictator’s payoff is subject to risk while the conditions
of the recipient’s payoff are equal to those in the standard
dictator game.
From research on dictator games under ambiguity, it is
known that dictators choose unfair splits more frequently
when the recipient’s payment allocation depends on an am-
biguous lottery (Haisley and Weber, 2010). Put differently,
dictators’ estimates of the expected value of the recipient’s al-
location are inflated under ambiguity. Experiments with bar-
gaining games, however, have shown that payoff uncertainty
on the part of the seller is likely to influence the terms of the
settlement in favor of the seller because the buyer is willing
to make concessions (see, e.g., Church and Zhang, 1999).
Analogously, this study will observe whether a dictator in a
dictator game setting is willing to allocate more money to the
recipient whose expected payoff from the money is higher rel-
ative to the dictator’s. Such behavior would be indicative of
strong other-regarding preferences triggered by an existen-
tial threat. Deception games, for instance, provide a strong
example for such preferences: One third of the subjects in
Erat and Gneezy (2012) willingly engage in lying that finan-
cially harms the sender but benefits the receiver, so-called al-
truistic white lying. It will be the purpose of this study to ex-
amine whether mortality awareness encourages non-selfish
motives in allocation decisions.
One might ask why an elevated risk of dying should im-
pact allocation decisions in the first place. The answer is
two-fold: Firstly, many factors typically influencing decision-
making become obsolete under anticipated death. Secondly,
new determinants may be added.
First addressing those factors which turn obsolete, one
example that comes into mind is hyperbolic discounting.
The tendency to choose a smaller-sooner reward over a
larger-later reward (Laibson, 1997) naturally does not play a
role for death-doomed individuals. Another example would
be the so-called forward consumption effect, defined by
Loewenstein and Elster (1992) as deriving utility from the
future through anticipatory savoring. Upon looming death,
contemplating the future will most likely not affect the util-
ity considerations behind the type of decisions this study is
concerned with.
Turning to those factors which may newly emerge as de-
cision variables under existential threat, we must first intro-
duce the term of mortality salience. Research on this topic
works with artificially activated death awareness and argues
that decisions under this condition are partially dependent on
self-defense mechanisms against anxiety, which usually re-
sults in selfish or socially endorsed behavior (Kasser and Shel-
don, 2000). In the context of allocation decisions, one might
also imagine that mortality salience and the concomitant lim-
ited time horizon to derive utility from a monetary endow-
ment may either encourage excessive spending or large trans-
fers to others driven by generosity and the realization that the
own relative utility is lower. To test which effect is dominant,
the experiment presented in this study attempts to align eco-
nomic research with the tradition of mortality salience exper-
iments.
“A common method of operationalising mortality
salience, however, takes the form of open-ended
questions asking individuals to express the feel-
ings and thoughts they experience when thinking
about their own death,” (Cozzolino et al., 2004b,
p.279).
Since priming and open-ended question do not match the
format of an economic experiment, the present study will at-
tempt to model an allocation decision under existential threat
by means of a modified dictator game.
Henceforth, the present study is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides a review of the related economic and psy-
chological literature. In section 3, the design of the exper-
iment underlying this study is outlined in detail. Section 4
explains the theoretical model behind the experiment as well
as the resulting hypotheses, followed by a comprehensive re-
port of the experimental results in section 5. Finally, Section
6 discusses the findings and their implications, the limitations
of this study, as well as proposals for future research.
2. Related Literature
2.1. Dictator Games under Risk
Early research on behavior in dictator game setting goes
back 25 years (Forsythe et al., 1994). In the standard sce-
nario, the game is played between two randomly paired play-
ers, one in the role of the dictator and one in the role of the
recipient. The dictator may then distribute an unearned pie
of $10 between the recipient and him-/herself. According
to the predictions of classic game theory, the strictly rational
decision in this setting is to allocate zero funds to the recip-
ient. In these early versions of the dictator game, average
allocations are typically 10-25% (Camerer, 2003). Attempts
to explain these non-trivial splits are manifold, but most of
them anchor at a concept of fairness. Since allocations in
dictator games are significantly different from those in sim-
ple ultimatum games where the recipient has the choice to
accept or reject the dictator’s proposal, fairness considera-
tions alone cannot entirely explain behavior in either of the
games, but instead strategic considerations also have an im-
pact (Forsythe et al., 1994). In subsequent studies, the dic-
tator’s action space was anonymized (with so-called double-
blind treatments) to test rule out the effect of social influence
(Hoffman et al., 1994). Generally, the dictator games are sen-
sitive to changes in the instructional setting: if the dictator
earns his/her role through a contest, giving is significantly
lower compared to treatments based on a random role allo-
cation (Hoffman et al., 1994).
In the standard dictator game, the total allocation amount
is fixed. Modified versions where the joint payoff can vary,
however, have studied the trade-off between efficiency, i.e.,
choosing an allocation which maximizes the joint output, and
equity, i.e., choosing a more equal allocation (Charness and
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Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2006). The equity-
efficiency tradeoff will be helpful to the understanding of
the experimental data gained in this study. Aside from con-
cerns for efficiency, inequality aversion is another motivation
prominently used to explain non-selfish allocations in dicta-
tor games (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
Brock et al. (2013) extend the discussion around non-
selfish giving to risky dictator treatments, which is an es-
pecially valuable research direction for the purpose of this
study. Their experiment involves treatments with one-sided
risk on the part of the recipient and such with two-sided
risk. The discussion of the results centers around two man-
ifestations of inequality aversion, namely ex post compari-
son and ex ante comparison. A fairness concept based on
ex post comparison values equality with regard to outcomes
after the resolution of uncertainty whereas ex ante compari-
son values equality with regard to chances to gain a certain
income, i.e., uses expected values as benchmark variable.
Brock et al. (2013) adapted these definitions from a study ex-
ploring consequentialist (ex post) and procedural (ex ante)
fairness in dictator games where the outcome either depends
on mutually exclusive or on independent probabilistic events,
i.e., comparing competitive with non-competitive treatments
(Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010). Both papers find that a combi-
nation of the concepts may be warranted. Freundt and Lange
(2017) present a paper extending the study of risky dictator
games to self- versus other-risk treatments. They find that
on average, giving decreases when the payoff to the recipi-
ent is risky. Risk imposed on the dictator’s own payoff even
leads to a relatively larger decline. The observed behavior
is explained by a crowding out effect of social preferences
if in conflict with risk preferences as defined by Güth et al.
(2008).
Although the present study also presents an experiment
based on unilaterally risky dictator treatments, the design
will deviate from that of Freundt and Lange (2017) to the
extent that our dictators will have safe transfer options, i.e.,
their own payoff risk does not increase with the amount given
to the recipient. Additionally, another gap in the literature
will be addressed through a variation of the risk level im-
posed to the dictator across all five treatments.
2.2. Mortality Salience
Progressing from the analysis of dictator games, the ex-
periment presented in this study also takes inspiration from
the psychological literature on behavior under mortality
salience. Experiments working with mortality salience aim
to activate subjects’ awareness of their own transience and
then test for changes in behavior.
A critical pillar for this stream of research is terror man-
agement theory (TMT). TMT hypothesizes that cultural be-
liefs are a coping mechanism against the anxiety resulting
from the awareness of life’s inevitable demise (Solomon
et al., 1991). For capitalist cultures, or people who en-
dorse extrinsic values, TMT predicts that mortality salience
activation will promote greedy behavior. The meaning main-
tenance model (MMM), a related theory, interprets death as
a threat to meaning, effectively de-valuing life, and views
the effect of mortality salience as an attempt to reinstate
meaning (Heine et al., 2006). Both theories coincide in the
assumption that death is a psychological threat necessitating
defense mechanisms. This is the angle point for mortality
salience research.
One economic approach used to test the behavioral ef-
fects of mortality salience is the resource dilemma. As Ko-
rtenkamp and Moore (2006) elaborate, this type of game
provides two interesting properties: a social dimension,
expressed in the trade-off between individual and group
benefit, and a temporal dimension contingent upon the fact
that resource exploitation typically has immediate positive
but delayed adverse effects. Harnessing such an environ-
ment, Kasser and Sheldon (2000) designed an experiment
in which subjects were instructed to represent companies
bidding against each other to harvest timber in a forest. The
researchers found that the mortality salience condition in-
duces higher consumption of resources and enhances greed.
However, the experiment relied on an imaginary scenario
limiting its external validity. Nevertheless, other studies
have corroborated the link between mortality salience and
greed (see, e.g., Cozzolino et al., 2004a. Two similar studies
found that death-related stimuli increase consumption quan-
tities of luxury goods (Mandel and Heine, 1999) as well as
food and beverages (Mandel and Smeesters, 2008).
Jonas et al. (2002), by contrast, provided evidence that
mortality salience elicits more favorable attitudes towards
charities, and increases the amount of money donated
(a form of prosocial behavior), which they referred to as
Scrooge effect. The observed behavior, however, is limited
to charities that match the subject’s worldview. Thus, the
results substantiate that mortality salience triggers a desire
to express culturally endorsed, in this case prosocial, behav-
ior. Supporting evidence for a correlation between mortality
awareness and prosocial behavior can be found in a study fo-
cusing on intergenerational decisions (Wade-Benzoni et al.,
2012). Usually, intertemporal and interpersonal distance
complicate generosity towards future generations. In this
study, subjects exhibited higher intergenerational benefi-
cence under death-priming, which the researchers attribute
to a reversal of the intertemporal distance effect counteract-
ing intergenerational discounting.
Overall, experimental evidence on the effect of mortality
salience is ambivalent. Some researchers have attempted to
broaden the spectrum of death priming to increase the clar-
ity of the results. Referring back to the definition of Kasser
and Ryan (1993), a study by Cozzolino et al. (2004a) postu-
lates that individuals scoring high on extrinsic value orienta-
tion (EVO) have a higher inclination towards greed under a
mortality salience condition, but not under a death reflection
condition. The latter was designed to render the association
of death more tangible and complement it with an element
of life review. Whenever the present study refers to mortality
salience, especially in the data analysis section, the term shall
be defined as “mortality awareness” and thus cover a broad
spectrum of death-related cognition.
S. F. Kovatsch / Junior Management Science 5(1) (2020) 35-4938
3. The Experiment
3.1. Experimental Design
The experiment conducted for the purpose of this study
consisted of a series of modified dictator games. An online
questionnaire was used to test responses to five dictator game
scenarios with different levels of risk. In each scenario, the
dictator is endowed with a fund of € 10 million and must
decide how to split this amount between him-/herself and
an anonymous receiver. The counterpart has no decision
power, i.e., he/she cannot reject the dictator’s allocation.
Treatments differed concerning the payoff consequences for
players. One treatment replicates the standard dictator game
whereas the other four treatments present the dictator with
different levels of risk imposed on his/her payoff.
A total of 178 subjects, all students, and predominantly
from the WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management cam-
pus in Vallendar, responded to the invitation for the online
experiment within one week in April 2019. All respondents
have an academic background in either business administra-
tion or economics. Subjects were invited to participate in the
experiment via e-mail. After clicking on the link to the exper-
iment, subjects were presented a set of general instructions
including an indication of the amount of time necessary to
complete the experiment. Prior to the dictator tasks, the sub-
jects were asked to state their willingness to pay for a lottery
with a 50% chance of winning € 200 and an equal chance
of being left with zero. In alignment with standard measure-
ments for risk aversion (Hartog et al., 2000), this pre-test
was designed to identify the individual risk attitude of each
respondent. A complete overview of the instructions can be
found in the Appendix (see Table A1 and Appendix 7).
Since all subjects participated in all five decision tasks,
the results presented in this study are within-subject com-
parisons. Dictators accessed the decision form from their
private devices and submitted all allocation choices online.
They were not informed of the outcomes of their decisions
between rounds. Lacking any decision power, the receiver
was treated as a dummy variable in the setting of this exper-
iment.
After the deadline for participation had passed, a random
draw determined which subject would receive the cash payoff
corresponding to the cumulative outcome of his/her alloca-
tion decisions. The winner of the draw received € 1 in cash
for each € 1 million kept to him-/herself in the experiment.
For the risky choices, i.e., tasks two to five, the outcome was
determined according to a dice roll reflecting the respective
risk attributed to the dictator’s own share. The winner of the
draw was contacted and paid in private. Subjects were not
informed of the outcomes of their choices during or after the
experiment.
3.2. Treatments
In each treatment, the dictator was asked to allocate€ 10
million (experimental currency) between him-/herself and
an anonymous counterpart. Thus, allocation options allowed
him/her to keep 10 − x [all in m€ ]1 to him-/herself and
transfer x ∈ [0, 1, . . . , 10] to his/her counterpart. The choice
was constrained to discrete steps of full millions.
Treatment 1 (T_C) is the baseline treatment and repli-
cates the standard dictator game with a stake size of € 10
million. Player’s payoffs can be denoted as (pi1,pi2) = F(10−
x , x) where pi1 is the dictator’s income and pi2 is the coun-
terpart’s income, both a function of the initial allocation de-
cided upon by the dictator. This treatment serves as a bench-
mark for the other treatments and aims to position this study
within the existing literature on dictator games.
In treatments 2, 3 and 4 (T_25, T_50, and T_75), the dic-
tator allocates his/her endowment as in treatment 1. While
the amount transferred to the recipient is not subject to any
additional conditions, the amount kept by the dictator is sub-
ject to a 25% (T_25), 50% (T_50), and 75% (T_75), risk of
value loss, respectively. Put differently, in each of the treat-
ments, a lottery de- termines if the dictator realizes a gain
equivalent to the share kept to him-/herself or realizes zero
income. Chances of losing the money amount to 25%, 50%,
and 75%, respectively. More formally, for all three treat-
ments, payoffs can be denoted as
pi1 =
§
0, with p1k
10− x , with 1− p1k , (1)
where p1k = 0,25 for T_25, p
1
k = 0, 5 for T_50 and p
1
k =
0, 75 for T_75, and pi2 = x . This notation clearly shows
that only the dictator him-/herself faces a risk in these treat-
ments. Across all three allocation tasks, it holds that E(x) <
E(10− x) for any unit of x . A dictator interested in maximiz-
ing the joint payoff would thus transfer the money to his/her
counterpart. The purpose of these treatments is to resemble a
situation as described in the introduction where the dictator
has an elevated risk of sudden death. In the event of sudden
death, the money will be worth nothing to the dictator. For
any other person, however, the money will not use its value,
as it is modeled by pi2 that has the same expected value as in
the baseline treatment.
Treatment 5 (T_H) is similar to T_50, but the role of
the recipient changes from an unrelated counterpart to that
of an heir. The purpose of T_H is to challenge the robust-
ness of the experimental design and more specifically, to test
whether the introduction on an heir who can, in the event of
the dictator’s death (in the model: realization of zero income
determined by the lottery), still derive utility from the dicta-
tor’s share of the endowment, has an impact on the dictator’s
allocation decision. Payoffs are structured similarly to T_50.
For the dictator, it can be denoted as
pi1 =
§
0, with p1k
10− x , with 1− p1k , (2)
where p1k = 0.5. Meanwhile, the heir’s payoff function can be
1All monetary amounts referred to in this paper are indicated in units of
m€
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described as follows:
pi2 =
(
x +

10− x
1+ 0.1

, with p1k
x , with 1− p1k
, (3)
It is important to highlight that the heir’s payoff is condi-
tional not only on the dictator’s allocation choice but also on
the lottery outcome. If the lottery determines that the dicta-
tor can keep his/her share, the heir will, as in the ordinary
dictator game scenario, realize a payoff of pi2 = x . Yet, if the
dictator loses his share to fate, the heir automatically gains
the amount equivalent to the dictator’s loss discounted by a
factor of d = 0.1. Thus, in this treatment, the heir receives a
minimum endowment of x , with an additional chance to gain
the dictator’s share discounted by 10%. In terms of social
welfare, this treatment forecloses the possibility of money
loss through the lottery. In fact, the lottery, here, serves as
a second allocation mechanism. Although the dictator can
still decide on the initial allocation of the endowment, the
lottery decides whether the split will be implemented or not.
If the outcome is at odds with the dictator’s luck, the lot-
tery prescribes a re-allocation of to the endowment to the
counterpart with only a small deduction. Chances for both
outcomes are equal. T_H was designed to render the model
of allocation decisions under existential threat more realistic
concerning two aspects: Firstly, it may be assumed that most
people facing a 50% risk of dying within the next few days
seek necessary precautions such as instructing a will which
settles the allocation of their wealth after their death. Sec-
ondly, even if an individual freely decided whether or not
he/she should transfer his/her endowment to somebody else
prior to his/her death, the recipient of the money would most
likely be a close friend or family member. Since a common
attribute to legal successions is that they only comprise in-
dividuals closely related to the deceased, the designation of
the recipient as an heir within the design of a dictator game
equips the anonymous counterpart with a natural familiar-
ity. The discount rate applied to the heir’s additional gain –
implemented only if the dictator’s income is zero after the lot-
tery draw – models a delayed payment. Since the legal pro-
ceeding of wills is typically lengthy, the heir must expect to
receive the endowment significantly later compared to a sit-
uation where the ancestor decides to transfer his/her wealth
prior to his/her death.
The five dictator treatments are complemented by one ad-
ditional task designed to provide an indication of the exper-
iment’s external validity. Subjects were instructed to imag-
ine a situation in which they just left the hospital after they
had been diagnosed with a lethal disease predicting a 75%
probability of terminating their life within the next couple of
days. Given this situation, subjects were asked to indicate
what they would do with their money if they had € 10 mil-
lion in the bank account. They were explicitly invited to con-
sider different consumption and transfer options. Prescribing
a 75% chance of sudden death, this task was designed as a
qualitative benchmark to the T_75 dictator treatment. The
framing of the question aimed at priming the subjects with a
certain degree of mortality salience. Answers could be sub-
mitted in key points or full sentences.
4. Related Theory and Hypotheses
4.1. Theoretical Model
For the development of the hypotheses to be tested in
the experimental part of this study, a model that helps to
test for allocation preferences needs to be formalized. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, for
instance, propose a model of social preferences which mea-
sures payoff differences to study fairness concepts based on
inequality aversion. In the present study, the focus will be
on social welfare implications of initial allocations. As es-
tablished in the introduction, the discussion of fairness un-
der risk must capture two dimensions: ex ante comparison
and ex post comparison. In alignment with existing literature
(Brock et al., 2012), social preferences will be examined over
a joint payoff function S(pi1,pi2) accounting for individual
utilities derived from the initial money allocation, denoted
as u(m1) for the dictator and u(m2) for his/her counterpart.
It will be assumed that E[u(m1)] is equal to E(pi1). Model-
ing the joint payoff function over individual utilities instead
of expected payoffs only, however, allows for the possibility
to drop this assumption in future extensions of the model.
Tailored to our five dictator treatments, the function of
joint expected payoff is described by
E [S (pi1,pi2)] = E [u (m1)] + E [u (m2)] , (4)
which can be rewritten as
E [S (pi1,pi2)] = u (m1) p
1
k + u (m2) p
2
k (5)
where p is the probability with which a player will eventu-
ally realize the income corresponding to the dictator’s allo-
cation decision. For the baseline treatment, it holds that
p1k = p
2
k = 1. In the risky treatments 2, (3; 4), p
2
k = 1 remains
unchanged whereas p1k is equal to 0.75 (0.5; 0.25). Values for
treatment 5 are equal to those of treatment 2. Starting from
there, it can be established that the social welfare maximizing
allocation [m1,m2] is [10− x; x] with x ∈ [0, 1, . . . , 10] for
the baseline treatment and [0; 10] for all other treatments.
Yet, it must be assumed that social welfare maximization is
not the most common decision rule among dictators, espe-
cially if it coincides with zero payoff for themselves (treat-
ments 2-5). Only purely altruistic players will favor such an
allocation.
Going forward, the implications of fair splits based on ex
ante and ex post comparison, two alternative decision rules,
shall be discussed with regard to our experimental treat-
ments. According to the principles of ex ante comparison,
only an equal split of the total endowment may be considered
fair. It follows that for all our treatments, the fair allocation
would be [5;5]. In the baseline treatment, this split still al-
lows for the maximization of joint payoff. For the risky treat-
ments, social welfare implications must be assessed based
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on expected individual utilities. Since E[u(m1)] decreases
with a smaller p1k , not only the dictator’s expected payoff but
also the joint payoff is negatively impacted for all allocations
6= [0; 10]. In treatment 2 (3; 4), a fair allocation complying
with the principles of ex ante comparison yields
E [S (pi1,pi2)] = (10− x)p1k + xp2k (6)
with x = 5, p1k = 0.75 (0.5;0.25) and p
2
k = 1, which equals
an expected joint payoff S(pi1,pi2) of 8.75 (7.5; 6.25). For
treatment 5, the case is more complex. It can be calculated
as follows:
E [S (pi1,pi2)] = E [u (m1)] + E [u (m2)] (7)
where E[u(m1)] = (10− x)0.5
and E[u(m2)] = x + 0.5

10− x
1.1

.
Substituting x with 0.5 yields E[S(pi1,pi2)] = 9.78 which
is close to the maximum of 10. Table 1 summarizes individual
expected utilities and joint payoffs for equal splits in all five
treatments.
Turning to decisions based on ex post comparison, the
definition of fair allocations as equal splits between the dic-
tator and his/her counterparts becomes obsolete. Fair splits,
under this principle, require equal expected utilities for both
players. More formally, the requirement for a fair allocation
according to the principle of ex post comparison can be de-
noted as:
E[u(m1)] = E[u(m2)] (8)
For our baseline treatment, this still implies an equal split
[0;10] between the players. In the risky treatments, how-
ever, the one-sided risk on the part of the dictator needs to
be compensated for with a higher endowment.
This can be easily derived if we rewrite our requirement
in the following way:
(10− x)p1k = xp2k (9)
For p1k < p
2
k and x ∈ [0,1, . . . , 10], which applies to all
risky treatments of the experiment, this equation can only
hold if x < 5. In the following, the process will be exempli-
fied for treatment 5 (T_H). From the previous analysis, it is
known that for TH
E[u(m1)] = 0.5(10− x) and E[u(m2)] = x+0.5

10− x
1.1

(10)
Equating the two expected utilities yields x =
10
23
, corre-
sponding to an allocation of

220
23
;
10
23
 ∼= [9.57;0.43] and
an expected social welfare of E[S(pi1,pi2)] = 9.57. Table 3
summarizes individual expected utilities and joint payoffs for
fair allocations according to the requirements of ex post com-
parison.
Notably, perfectly fair splits according to ex post compar-
ison can only be realized in the baseline treatment and treat-
ment four because allocation decisions in the experiment are
subject to the constraint that x ∈ [0, 1, . . . , 10]. To accommo-
date this constraint in the experimental design, it will be as-
sumed that a discrete split of the initial endowment is compli-
ant with the concept of fairness based on ex post comparison
if x takes on the value closest to the corresponding x ∈ R.
In treatment 2, for instance, a fair allocation as defined by
ex post comparison would be [6;4], corresponding to an ex-
pected social welfare of E[S(pi1,pi2)] = 8.5. Table 2 sum-
marizes individual expected utilities and joint payoffs for fair
allocations under the constraint that the definition range of
x encompasses discrete value only and compliant with the
rules of ex post comparison.
It may be highlighted that the fair allocation in the heir
treatment (5) is for the dictator to keep the entire endow-
ment to him-/herself and give nothing to his/her heir. With
a 50% chance of receiving a slightly discounted amount of
the dictator’s share, the heir’s expected payoff over the initial
split, even if he/she is awarded nothing, is sufficiently high
to justify an allocation of [10;0] according to the principle of
ex post comparison.
Fair splits compliant with the requirements of ex ante ver-
sus ex post comparison will be considered in the analysis of
the experimental data. More precisely, it will be evaluated to
which degree individuals are willing to compromise on both
individual utility maximization and social welfare maximiza-
tion in order to implement an allocation that is considered
fair. Generally, it may be noteworthy that fair splits compli-
ant with ex post comparison yield higher expected utilities
for the dictator as well as a higher expected joint payoff.
Aside from inequality aversion, concerns for efficiency
will also be taken into account. Hence, an additional fac-
tor considered in the analysis will be the efficiency of capital
employment, defined as
e =
E[S(pi1,pi2)]
max (S)
(11)
The higher e, the closer is the expected joint payoff corre-
sponding to the dictator’s allocation choice to the maximum
possible joint payoff.
4.2. Theoretical Predictions
Prediction 1: Giving in the standard dictator game is not
fully consistent with allocation decisions unilaterally risky
dictator games.
This assumption extends to two levels: Firstly, dictators’ al-
location decisions under personal risk will deviate from de-
cisions without risk in absolute terms. Secondly, a differ-
ence will also be observed in relative terms, implying that
the share of dictators complying with the concept of ex ante
or ex post fairness, as well as those making purely altruistic
decisions will vary across treatments. Prediction 1 allows for
two alternative hypotheses as explained in the following.
H1: Facing personal risk, dictators will allocate more
money to their counterpart.
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Table 1: Expected utilities for equal splits
Exp. utilities with a fair split according to ex ante comp.
max (S) Allocation E[u(m1)] E[u(m2)] E[S(pi1,pi2)]
T_C 10 [5; 5] 5 5 10
T_25 10 [5; 5] 3,75 5 8, 75
T_50 10 [5; 5] 2, 5 5 7, 5
T_75 10 [5; 5] 1,25 5 6, 25
T_H 10 [5; 5] 2, 5 7,28 9, 78
Table 2: Expected utilities for fair splits according to ex post comparison (discrete)
Exp. utilities with a fair split according to ex post comp.
max (S) Allocation
(discrete)
E[u(m1)] E[u(m2)] E[S(pi1,pi2)]
T_C 10 [5; 5] 5 5 10
T_25 10 [6; 4] 4, 5 4 8, 5
T_50 10 [7; 3] 3, 5 3 6, 5
T_75 10 [8; 2] 2 2 4
T_H 10 [10; 0] 5 4,55 9, 55
Table 3: Expected utilities for fair splits according to ex post comparison (stationary)
Exp. utilities with a fair split according to ex post comp.
max (S) Allocation
(stationary)
E[u(m1)] E[u(m2)] E[S(pi1,pi2)]
T_C 10 [5; 5] 5 5 10
T_25 10 [5,71; 4,29] 4,44 4,44 8, 88
T_50 10 [6,67; 3,33] 3,33 3,33 6, 66
T_75 10 [8; 2] 2 2 4
T_H 10 [9,57; 0,43] 4,785 4,785 9, 57
H1 is consistent with the idea that dictators care about their
decisions’ impact on joint payoff (social welfare). If their
own share is subject to risk, but the counterpart’s share is
unaffected, dictators who honor the social welfare dimen-
sion of their decisions will give higher amounts (in relative
and absolute terms) to their counterparts than non-risky con-
ditions. On a higher level, H1 would imply that individuals
facing existential threat favor a transfer of their endowment
over excessive self-consumption because others might derive
more sustainable utility from the money. In other words,
mortality salience will reinforce other-regarding preferences.
H2: Facing personal risk, dictators will keep more money
to themselves.
H2 assumes that dictators will try to equalize expected pay-
offs for both players, which is consistent with the concept of
fairness based on ex post comparison. Compared to the stan-
dard dictator game, decisions involving personal risk will in-
centivize dictators to increase the share kept to themselves
(in absolute terms). In the context of decisions made under
an elevated risk of sudden death, this hypothesis would imply
that mortality salience will reinforce selfish motives. Individ-
uals who are aware of their limited time and consumption
horizon will try to maximize their own utility without regard
for the social consequences of their consumption decisions.
Although both hypotheses can be sufficiently justified, H1
is considered to be more likely than H2 and will serve as the
basis for predictions 3 and 4.
Prediction 2: Allocation decisions in risky dictator games
are not exclusively driven by the dictator’s degree of risk aver-
sion.
Modeling existential threat through a risky lottery comes at
the disadvantage that upward deviations from giving in the
standard dictator game may be induced by sheer risk avoid-
ance. Put differently, dictator’s allocating more to their coun-
terpart in the risky treatment might just be risk-averse. By
contrast, prediction 2 anticipates a weak correlation between
risk aversion and higher giving in risky dictator games. In-
stead, risk aversion should be treated as a confounding vari-
able in the regression run on giving in the unilaterally risky
dictator games dependent on giving in the baseline treat-
ment.
Prediction 3: Neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can
explain giving in unilaterally risky dictator games. Instead,
non-selfish allocations reflect a preference for efficient capi-
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tal employment.
Instead of reflecting the dictator’s degree of risk aversion,
higher giving in risky dictator games may be explained by
the dictator’s preference for efficient capital allocations. This
prediction is construed ex negativo: From the review of the
existing literature on risky dictator games, it is hypothesized
that neither altruism nor ex ante or ex post comparison can
fully explain allocation decisions in unilaterally risky dictator
games. Instead, a preference for efficient capital employment
aimed at a constrained optimization of the joint payoff may
be a driver behind non-zero giving in the risky treatments.
An interest in social welfare, in this case, is equal to the un-
derstanding that other players may derive higher utility from
the endowment.
Prediction 4: Generous giving in dictator games increases
with the level of risk assigned to the dictator’s own payoff.
As stated earlier, prediction 3 is conditional on higher giving
in the unilaterally risky dictator games relative to the base-
line treatment. In extension to the preceding conjecture, it
may be expected that the predicted behavior is amplified by
a higher degree of risk attributed to the dictator’s share. No-
tably, this is not equivalent to the assumption that the dicta-
tor’s concern about the joint payoff increases with the level of
harm he/she can cause to social welfare. Any theory based
exclusively on the correlation between giving in risky dictator
games and the level of unilateral risk will be not consistent
with varying results across treatments T_50 and T_H. Both
treatments assign a 50% chance of value loss to the dictator’s
share but with significantly less downside for social welfare
in the heir treatment (5).
Prediction 5: One-sided risk in dictator games can effec-
tively simulate allocation decisions under existential threat.
Lastly, the experimental design presented in this study is
based on the assumption that unilateral exposure to risk in
a dictator game scenario resembles a simulation where an
individual faces a life-endangering hazard. Prediction 4 will
be tested by comparing the subjects’ responses toQMS_75 to
those of the dictator treatment T_75. If it holds, the relative
number of selfish versus other-regarding use cases listed in
QMS_75 will mirror the quantitative split between self-use
and transfer to the counterpart in the fourth dictator treat-
ment.
5. Experimental Results (Data Analysis)
A summary of the dictator’s allocation decisions is pro-
vided in Table 4.
The table average choices and the proportion of players
choosing x > 0, x ≥ 5 and x = 10 for all five treatments.
Average giving in the standard dictator game, for instance,
is x = 2.63 (∼= 26%) and thus consistent with the results re-
ported previous studies (Engel, 2011). Notably, significant
positive giving can be observed in all treatments. Figure A5
shows the average contribution by task whereas Figure A6
depicts the fraction of dictator’s giving non-zero amounts and
those giving more than the fairness concept based on ex post
comparison requires (both in the Appendix). In the follow-
ing, it will be explored in detail how allocation decisions dif-
fer across treatments in detail.
Result 1: Behavior in the standard dictator game is not a
good predictor of giving in unilaterally risky treatments. On
average, dictators behave more generously when exposed to
risk.
Evidently, average contributions in the standard dictator
game are significantly different (at 1% level) from giving in
the risky dictator treatments (Table 5). The summary statis-
tics of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test run on all treatments
also reveals that the group means are, in fact, significantly
different between any two treatments except for T_50 and
T_H. This outlier was to be expected because the heir treat-
ment is an adaptation of T_50 and exposes the dictator to
the same level of risk.
Table 6 displays the results of a linear regression which
tries to explain the allocation decisions in risky dictator
games as a function of allocation choice in the standard
dictator game (T_C). Regression results substantiate that
giving in the standard dictator game is not always predic-
tive of giving under personal risk: the significance of the
coefficient for giving in T_C decreases with the level of risk
imposed on the dictator treatments. This implies that de-
cisions under risk are not driven by the same motives as
decisions in ordinary dictator games. Nevertheless, generos-
ity in the standard dictator game is predictive of a tendency
of giving under mild risk (coefficients are significant at 1%
level for T_25 and T_H).
Result 2: The dictator’s degree of risk aversion does not
moderate the effect of risk on allocation decisions in dictator
games.
To control for the correlation between risk profile and behav-
ior in the dictator game treatments on the individual level,
the experimental design comprised a task testing for the will-
ingness to pay (WTP) for a risky lottery. The lottery was de-
signed in a way that subjects would face an expected value of
€ 100 with a 50% chance of winning € 200. Subjects could
state their upper price threshold for a ticket to participate in
the lottery. Results were evaluated on both descriptive and
analytical statistics.2
Firstly, subjects were assigned to a specific cluster accord-
ing to the WTP stated in the lottery task. Four different clus-
ters are used based on the definition of different levels of
risk-aversion. Cluster 1 comprises strictly risk-averse subjects
with a WTP between € 0 and € 49 (n= 70), i.e., below half
of the lottery’s expected value. Cluster 2 also contains risk-
averse agents but with a WTP above half of the lottery’s ex-
pected value, specifically between € 49 and € 98 (n = 53).
The third cluster counts subjects (n = 53) with an approxi-
matively risk-neutral profile displaying a WTP between € 99
and € 100. Subjects with a risk-loving attitude, i.e., stating
a WTP above the lottery’s expected value, are classified as
cluster 4. Yet, this cluster only comprises a very small por-
tion of the original sample (n = 4). All four clusters were
2Task is referred to as QL in the data analysis
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Table 4: Summary statistics of the allocation decisions
*For the individual treatments, this means: x ≥ 5 (T_C); x ≥ 4 (T_25), x ≥ 4 (T_50), x ≥ 2 (T_75); x ≥ 0 (T_H)
n Mean giving SD of giving % of
dictators
giving x > 0
% x ≥ ’fair
split ex post’*
% of
dictators
giving x ≥ 5
% of
dictators
giving x = 10
T_C 178 2,63 2,22 68% 32% 32% 1%
T_25 178 4,65 3,42 84% 57% 47% 20%
T_50 178 5,47 3,42 90% 76% 63% 25%
T_75 178 6,22 3,75 88% 83% 67% 33%
T_H 178 5,28 3,90 79% 100% 61% 29%
Table 5: Differences in giving (n= 178)
Differences tested with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. *** (**, *) indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
T_25 T_50 T_75 T_H
T_C 2, 02 *** 2,84 *** 3, 60 ***
T_25 0, 81 *** 1,57 ***
T_50 0,76 *** −0,19
Table 6: Linear regression of allocation decisions in a standard dictator game treatment (independent variable: x in T_C) on
giving under risk (clustering at the individual level)
Differences tested with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. *** (**, *) indicates significance at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependant variable
T_25 T_50 T_75 T_H
Amount given in T_C (coeff.) 0, 4009 *** 0,2727 ** 0,1848 0,3593 ***
Constant 3, 60 *** 4,75 *** 5, 74 *** 4,34 ***
Pseudo R-squared 0,07 0, 02 0,01 0, 04
F-statistic 12, 84 *** 5,7 ** 2,14 7,37 ***
evaluated with regard to deviations in average giving from
the sample mean per treatment. The descriptive analysis
reveals three main observations: Firstly, cluster deviations
occur across all treatments including the non-risky baseline
game, implying that individual risk attitudes may be influen-
tial to dictator games in general, not only in risky treatments.
Secondly, average deviations in giving are positive for cluster
1 and become increasingly negative from there. Only clus-
ter 4 seems to show an average deviation above 5% from the
sample mean (close to the 20% level), but due to its small
sample size, the effect may be distorted. Thirdly, there seems
to be no consistent pattern as to which treatment elicits the
most substantial deviations on cluster level. This may serve
as an indication that risk attitudes are not predictive of giv-
ing in risky dictator games. Table A2 provides the summary
statistics of differences in giving by cluster whereas Table A3
displays a consolidated overview of the standard deviation
by cluster on treatment level.
Secondly, in order to verify the assumed weak correla-
tion between individual risk attitude and the dictator game
results, a regression was run on the WTP in the lottery de-
pendent on giving in the different dictator game treatments.
Table 7 summarizes the results on treatment level. Notably,
coefficients are negative for all treatments.
In extension to the previous analysis, the regression re-
veals for which treatments groups risk attitudes are most in-
fluential. The coefficient for the risk level is only significant
for T_75 (at 5% level) and T_H (at 10% level). Thus, in
contrast to the intuition derived from the descriptive analy-
sis, individual risk attitudes seem to gain in decision weight
with the level of risk attached to the dictator’s payoff conse-
quences. Nevertheless, the effect is negligibly weak since the
coefficient size is considerably small for both treatments.
Overall, it may be concluded that allocation decisions in
risky dictator games are not primarily attributable to the dic-
tator’s risk attitude, even though a small effect can be ob-
served for the high-risk treatment.
Result 3: Neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can ex-
plain giving in unilaterally risky dictator games. Allocation
decisions may be influenced by a preference for efficient cap-
ital employment rooted in the dictator’s concern for the joint
payoff.
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Table 7: Linear regression of risk aversion (independent variable: P in QL) on allocation decisions in dictator game treatments
(clustering at the individual level)
Dependant variable
T_C T_25 T_50 T_75 T_H
WTP in QL (coeff.) −0, 0035 −0, 0061 −0, 0054 −0, 0104 * −0, 0074 *
Constant 2, 83 *** 5,01 *** 5, 79 *** 6, 84 *** 5,72 ***
Pseudo R-squared 0,01 0, 01 0,01 0,03 0, 01
F-statistic 1,94 3, 41 2,03 6, 35 ** 2,94 *
While the joint payoff, or social welfare, can be maximized
by any choice of x in the baseline treatment, the risky dictator
games presented in this study only allow for the maximum
joint payoff if the purely altruistic choice (x = 10) is real-
ized. Previous studies have shown that only a minor fraction
(approx. 5%) of dictators exhibits purely altruistic behavior
(Engel, 2011). Consequently, if the dictator’s interest in the
joint payoff shall recoup attention in this study, it needs to be
in form of a constrained maximization. Constrained, in this
case, means that the dictator tries to employ the initial en-
dowment of 10m€ efficiently without forgoing his own pay-
off entirely. More generally, it refers to all allocations which
are attentive towards the social welfare implications but do
not leave the dictator with an expected payoff of zero.
Prior to evaluating the relevance of social welfare con-
cerns going along with efficient capital employment, the new
experimental data will be screened for evidence supporting
the application of four other decision rules emphasized in
the existing literature: aversion against a purely selfish maxi-
mization of payoff chances, ex post comparison, ex ante com-
parison, and altruistic maximization of joint payoff (listed in
order of decreasing x required to comply with the rule). Ta-
ble 4, presented at the beginning of this section, shows the
proportion of dictators exceeding the minimum requirements
for these rules as specified in Table 8.
Overall, the experimental results show that all four types
of non-selfish allocations occur across all five treatments, al-
though altruistic maximization of the joint payoff is almost
non-existent in the standard dictator game. The fraction of
subjects choosing allocations which exceed one of the four
thresholds for compliance seems to increase with the risk im-
posed to the dictator’s endowment. Growth rates are gener-
ally the highest between the baseline treatment and T_25
and maintain a rate for ex ante comparison and altruism,
while the incremental fraction of subjects complying with the
other two decision rules seem to abate with an increasing
level of risk.
Remarkably, a closer look at the fraction of dictators im-
planting an allocation choice which exactly equals one of the
four minimum requirements (cf. Table 9) reveals that espe-
cially for the risky treatments, the portion of subjects who
do not exactly comply with any of those four strategies is
considerably high (51% for T_25, 40% for T_50, and 46%
for T_75). Since these treatments equally induce a signif-
icantly higher percentage of non-zero giving than the stan-
dard dictator game which, hence, cannot be explained by
fairness concepts based on ex post or ex ante comparison,
there is an explanation gap as to which other drivers moti-
vate non-zero giving in unilaterally risky dictator games. It
stands to reason that the observed behavior reflects the dic-
tator’s preference for efficient capital employment allowing
for constrained joint payoff maximization.
Result 4: Generosity in risky dictator games increases
with the dictator’s own risk, not the risk attached to the joint
payoff.
As a next step, the analysis needs to address the role of risk
imposed on the dictator’s own share versus the risk affecting
the joint payoff. As reported earlier, unilaterally risky dictator
games seem to elicit more generous giving than the baseline
scenario, and the effect seems to increase with the level of
risk assigned to the dictator’s payoff. To test for the robust-
ness of this result against the hypothesis that higher giving
correlates with the degree to which the dictator’s decision
affects the joint payoff, the heir treatment (T_H) was intro-
duced. In treatments T_25, T_50 and T_75, a higher level
of risk for the dictator comes along with a higher level of risk
to the joint payoff. In T_H, however, the risk assigned to
the dictator’s own payoff is equal to T_50 whereas the risk
to the joint payoff is significantly cut. The minimum pay-
off for the dictator is 0€ at a 50% probability whereas the
minimum social payoff is 9.09m€ at a probability of ≤50%.
For both values, 10m€marks the upper margin. Hence, of
dictators behaved significantly more generous in T_50 com-
pared to T_H, this would imply that higher giving in uni-
laterally risky dictator games is not dependent on the risk
imposed to the dictator’s own payoff, but the risk imposed
to the joint payoff. Results show that more dictators transfer
the entire endowment to their counterparts in T_H (x = 10),
but likewise, more dictators keep the money to themselves
(x = 0) in T_H compared to T_50 (Table 9). In aggregate,
the two effects seem to cancel each other out. Average giv-
ing is x = 5.28 in T_H and x = 5.47 in T_50. A Wilcoxon
signed-rank test run on the results indicates that the differ-
ence is not significant (Table 5). Consequently, the data sug-
gests that more generous giving in unilaterally risky dictator
games, de facto, increases with the level of risk attributed
to the dictator’s payoff, not the level of risk attributed to the
joint payoff. With regard to the motivational drivers behind
this behavior, the results encourage the assumption that the
generosity exhibited in unilaterally risky dictator games is not
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Table 8: Minimum requirements for four non-selfish decision rules in dictator games
Decision Rule Minimum Requirement
Aversion against purely selfish maximization Allocation such that x > 0
Ex post comparison of payoff chances Allocation such that E(pi1) = E(pi2) holds for min(x)
Ex ante comparison of payoff chances Allocation such that x ≥ 5
Altruistic maximization of joint payoff Allocation such that x = 10
Table 9: Fraction of dictators pursuing a one out of four strategies: pure selfishness, ex post comparison, ex ante comparison
or pure altruism
*For the individual treatments, this means: x = 5 (T_C); x = 4 (T_25), x = 4 (T_50), x = 2 (T_75); x = 0 (TH)
Mean giving % of subjects
with x=0
% x = ’fair
split ex post’*
% of subjects
with x=5
% of subjects
with x = 10
Remaining subjects
T_C 2, 63 6% 31% 31% 1% 31%
T_25 4, 65 4% 10% 15% 20% 51%
T_50 5, 47 7% 8% 20% 25% 40%
T_75 6, 22 6% 9% 6% 33% 46%
T_H 5, 28 6% 21% 16% 29% 29%
induced by regret minimization but by a preference for allo-
cating the money efficiently.
Result 5: Unilaterally risky dictator treatments hold con-
siderable external validity for decisions under existential
threat.
As stated earlier, the experiment presented in this study in-
corporated a qualitative task priming subjects with ephemerality-
related thoughts while asking what subjects would use their
money for if they only had a 25% chance of surviving the
next days.
Remarkably, the responses accurately reflect the split
pointed to in prediction 1 in which two different scenar-
ios were anticipated: under existential threat, individuals
would either become more generous considering that their
own utility from a monetary endowment is subject to a high
level of risk (H1), or they would become increasingly selfish
because the time horizon for consumption is suddenly very
limited and social consequences carry little weight (H2). Yet,
while the answers carry clues for both hypotheses, they also
provide a good indication of which scenario prevails. Evi-
dence of H1 is not only voiced more frequently but also more
resolutely as illustrated by these two examples:
I would not spend the money in the next few
days. [. . . ] Spending the money on personal
pleasure and dying right afterwards would be a
waste.
I wouldn’t consume anything but rather find a
person that can make better use of the money.
Support for H2 is usually restricted to only a fraction of
the money, which can be exemplified referring to these two
responses:
I would fly out all my friends and myself to Tas-
mania for a final dinner. [. . . ] Whatever is left of
the money after all this, I would give to the Tas-
manian Wildlife fund. 10 million can be better
employed elsewhere.
Give 6 million to charity and waste the rest like
it is the end of the world.
For a comprehensive evaluation of the answers, six
designated use cases were identified from the most fre-
quently used keywords: self-use (luxury/gambling), self-
use (event/experiences), long-term investments/trust funds,
therapy research, (charitable) donations, and transfers to
family and friends (F&F). While the first two use cases clearly
resemble an allocation decision in favor of the dictator and
the last two use cases resemble an allocation in favor of
his/her counterpart, the use cases named third and fourth
do not explicitly fall into one of those categories. Addition-
ally, it is essential to note that these use cases are collectively
exhaustive but not mutually exclusive since subjects were
not restricted in the number of items when answering the
question. Table 10 provides an overview of the popularity
of each use case relative to the number of subjects and rel-
ative to the total number of items listed in the responses to
QMS_75.
In order to verify the external validity of the experimental
design, however, it is necessary to assess whether the rela-
tive number of selfish versus other-regarding use cases listed
in QMS_75 mirrors the quantitative split between self-use
and transfer to the counterpart in the T_75 dictator game
treatment. As a reminder, the mean in the fourth treatment
amounts to x = 6.22, meaning that on average, dictators
transferred 62.25% of their endowment to the other player.
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Table 10: Common use cases for the endowment (sorted by popularity, n= 52)
* Number of responses applicable to Question QMS_75. Percentages within this row indicate how many subjects
relative to the total number of subjects would spend money on the respective use case.
** Number of items accounting for the possibility of multiple answers. Percentages within this row indicate how many times a use case is mentioned relative
to the total number of items listed
n Therapy
Research
Self-use:
Luxury/
Gambling
Long-term
invest-
ments/Trust
funds
(Charitable)
Donations
Self-use:
Event/
Experiences
Transfer to
F&F
Fraction by
subjects
176* 10% 14% 24% 32% 49% 60%
Fraction by
items
333** 5% 7% 13% 17% 26% 32%
Accounting for the number of use cases which clearly clas-
sify as self-use (luxury/gambling and event/experiences, to
be specific) relative to the total number of items listed in the
responses to QMS_75 and balancing the result against the
share of other-regarding use cases (donations and transfers
to F&F) while subtracting out those use cases that do not ex-
plicitly match either category yields a 33% share of selfish
use-cases. This result is approximately consistent with the
37.75% share predicted by T_75. However, this comparison
is imprecise to the extent that it only considers the relative
number of times certain use cases are listed, not the amount
of money allocated towards them.
For the purpose of refining the analysis of the qualita-
tive data collected in QMS_75, only those answers which in-
dicated a clearly quantifiable allocation of the endowment
to one or more use cases were extracted from the sample
(n = 52). Table 11 summarizes the total as well as the rela-
tive amount of money [in m€ and %, respectively] across the
applicable responses allocated to any of the six designated
use cases.
Coloring indicates whether the use case counts as self-
use (orange), transfer to others (green), or matches neither
of those categories (white). It can be discerned that only
7% of the money is used for self-consumption, 18% is allo-
cated towards long-term investments and trust funds, and
75% is transferred to family and friends. Even if it is argued
that long-term investment and trust funds can be classified
as self-use and thus, on average, subjects keep 25% of their
endowment to themselves, an average of 75% transferred to
others still does not exactly match the average of 62.25% pre-
dicted in the corresponding dictator treatment (T_75). One
explanation for this incongruence may be that the QMS_75
task allowed subjects to specify to whom exactly they would
transfer the money and a large fraction chose to endow their
family and friends, which is also the reason why one of the
six high-level use cases is called “transfer to F&F” instead of
“transfer to others”. Transfers to close friends or relatives can
be assumed to earn subjects a higher social utility than trans-
fers to the anonymous counterpart they were paired with in
the dictator treatments. The effect of social distance is undis-
puted in the dictator game literature (Leider, Möbius, Rosen-
blat, and Quoc-Anh, 2009; Goeree et al., 2010). Unsurpris-
ingly, also in the present experiment, only four subjects in the
entire sample explicitly stated that they would like to transfer
a portion of the money to strangers.
I would give away cash to random people on the
street as well as to people on my day-to-day ways
(e.g. the salesperson at REWE, the bakery etc.)
With this in mind, it may be concluded the data collected
from the QMS_75 task and the T_75 dictator game is con-
sistent in the result that a vast majority of subjects prefers to
grant a portion well above 50% of their endowment to an-
other person. This substantiates the claim made in H1 and
opens it to a broader context: Facing personal risk, e.g., un-
der existential threat, not only dictators in a dictator game
setting but individuals, in general, become more generous
and transfer a higher fraction of their endowment to others.
Overall, the results suggest that the experimental design fea-
tures a sufficient level of external validity for decisions under
existential threat. This result is diluted only by the fact that
baseline frequencies under artificial dictator games contexts,
in general, are inflated relative to those exhibited in a natural
setting (Winking and Mizer, 2013).
6. Discussion and Conclusion
6.1. Contribution to the Academia
In extension to the existing literature on both risky dic-
tator games and mortality salience, the present study con-
tributes an account of allocation decisions under existential
threat. Numerous studies on giving in dictator (and ultima-
tum) games attempt to explain behavior inconsistent with the
predictions of classic game theory by models of social pref-
erences that allow for non-selfish motives such as inequality
aversion or concerns for efficiency. It remained to be assessed
how such social behavior changes with different levels of risk
attached to the dictator’s payoff, or, equivalently, under ex-
istential threat. Hence, this study does not only contribute
an entirely new variation of the dictator game comparing
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Table 11: Fraction of money allotted to most popular use cases (sorted by popularity, n= 52)
* Number of subjects who clearly quantified their allocation of money in QMS_75.
n Therapy
Research
Self-use:
Luxury/
Gambling
Self-use:
Event/
Experiences
Long-term
invest-
ments/Trust
funds
(Charitable)
Donations
Transfer to
F&F
Total
Money
allocated
[m€ ]
52* 4 12 24 92 148 238 518
Money
allocated
[%]
52* 1% 2% 5% 18% 29% 46% 100%
behavior under different degrees of self-risk but simultane-
ously provides a first attempt to synthesize research in the
field of experimental economics with (mainly psychological)
research dedicated to understanding behavior under the con-
dition of mortality salience.
The study finds that allocation decisions in dictator’s
games tend to become more generous when only the dic-
tator’s payoff is at risk. This is inconsistent with the find-
ings of Freundt and Lange (2017) and is also at odds with
evidence suggesting that mortality awareness spurs greed
(Kasser and Sheldon, 2000; Cozzolino et al., 2004a). How-
ever, the new results can be aligned with another stream
of mortality salience research arguing that existential threat
actually increases pro-social behavior (Jonas et al., 2000;
Wade-Benzoni et al., 2012). Similarly, consistency with the
existing literature on dictator games can be stabilized un-
der the assumption that giving in unilaterally risky dictator
games is motivated by a preference for efficient capital em-
ployment (Charness and Rabin, 2002). Freundt and Lange
(2017) did provide their dictators with a safe transfer op-
tion, which made giving, even in the self-risk treatments,
disadvantageous to the social welfare. A concern for social
welfare which motivates non-selfish allocation decisions is
also consistent with findings from experiments on social lot-
teries indicating that subjects are also more risk-averse in
social lotteries compared to a situation where only their own
payoff is exposed to risk (Gaudeul, 2013).
Moreover, the presented results reveal that generosity
in risky dictator games increases with the dictator’s own
risk, not the risk attached to the joint payoff, and show that
risk aversion falls short of explaining dictators’ behavior in
unilaterally risky games. Therewith, this study provides a
first attempt towards a better understanding of allocation
decisions under unilateral risk and simultaneously bridges
the gap to research on allocation decisions under existen-
tial threat. Eventually, it needs to be acknowledged that
the study does not claim to portray an exhaustive model of
dictator giving under elevated mortality awareness and the
omission of decisive determinants cannot be precluded.
6.2. Limitations
The presented experiment is subject to a set of limitations,
especially from a methodological perspective. Chiefly, the
subject pool is rather homogeneously composed of students
with a background in economics. Additionally, the gender
split is not equal, which might skew the results downwards,
since allocation decisions in all treatments show significant
differences depending on the dictator’s gender (Table 12; for
the gender-specific breakdown of the means per treatment,
see Table A4 in the Appendix). Another issue is that the
within-subject design naturally bears the risk of carry-over
and position effects distorting the latter treatments.
When it comes to the design of the treatments, it must be
acknowledged that the standard dictator game is played with
an endowment of € 10 instead of 10m€ and research has
shown that a larger stake size has a small but significant ad-
verse effect on giving in dictator games (Larney et al., 2019).
Moreover, the qualitative response task (QMS_75) could be
optimized for comparison with the dictator treatment T_75
by requesting quantifiable allocations of the 10m€ to pre-
defined use-cases. Yet, the current design gives a better ac-
count of the experiment’s external validity. Overall, however,
the equivalences between allocation decisions in unilaterally
risky dictator treatments and such under existential threat
must be proven by additional side-treatments controlling for
the experiment’s validity.
6.3. Concluding Remarks
Unilateral risk on the part of the dictator’s payoff encour-
ages more generous allocation decisions. The observed ef-
fect is largely independent of the dictator’s risk profile and
is stronger for higher-risk treatments. On a higher level, the
witnessed behavior indicates an increase in other-regarding
preferences under existential threat. Since psychological ex-
periments on mortality salience are inconclusive about this
effect, further research should be dedicated to modeling de-
cisions under existential threat with different types of eco-
nomic games in order to improve the robustness of the re-
sults. Another interesting angle for further research on eco-
nomic decisions under existential threat would be a compar-
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Table 12: Average deviation from sample mean giving by gender
n T_C T_25 T_50 T_75 TH
Dev. (F) 64 0,68 0, 52 0,56 0, 95 1,05
Dev. (M) 114 −0, 38 −0, 29 −0,32 −0, 53 −0, 59
ative analysis of the relevance ascribed to different consump-
tion options for a given amount of money. Similar to the ret-
rospective use case analysis applied to QMS_75, it would be
intriguing to present subjects with a set of consumption op-
tions from different categories, for instance spending money
on travel, luxury goods, psychedelic drugs or an R&D in-
vestment for the own family business. Such trade-off de-
cisions would be especially interesting in combination with
research suggesting the affective deconstruction of the prob-
ability weighting function. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001),
for instance, provide evidence that individuals’ sensitivity to-
wards changes in probabilities near certainty and impossi-
bility increases with the level of affect attached to a lottery.
On the background of these findings, it may be possible that
individuals favor affect-rich consumption choices under ex-
istential threat. Finally, another research proposal would
be to take an economic view on actual doomsday decisions.
Doomsday decisions, as shortly referred to in the introduc-
tory section, require a situation where not only one affected
party but all parties of a decision are confronted with an el-
evated risk of dying within the next few days. Economically
speaking, not only the payoff uncertainty is affected, but the
time horizon for consuming utility from money is limited for
all affected stakeholders. In synopsis, it may be concluded
that the academic potential in the synthesis of economic and
psychological research on decisions under existential threat
is far from being exhausted. Nevertheless, the present study
sets the first impulse towards a better understanding of the
economic preferences of terminally ill individuals. Simulta-
neously, artificially induced mortality salience may be lever-
aged to nudge people into more generous giving or to im-
prove long-term strategic planning in (family) businesses.
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